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Since the 1960s Colombia has exhibited notorious economic stability and institutional
continuity.  Until recently, the political system was based on an entrenched bipartisan
coalition, with little ideological confrontation. Power sharing --mandatory during the
National Front (NF, 1958-74)-- lasted until 1991. Coffee, the main export, takes place in
thousands of family-owned plots. Coffee producers’ income depends on a complex
arrangement with the government, the exchange rate being but one component. The
relevance of labor unions is limited to the public sector.  Following a 1968 Constitutional
amendment, Congress’ role in economic issues has been limited to fiscal policy, the
tailoring of the budget being its main concern. A survey of key episodes indicates that
efforts have generally been geared towards delivering a moderate rate of inflation and a
competitive exchange rate. Widespread indexation has made this arrangement palatable to
most groups. Historically, exchange rate policy was conducted in tandem with
commercial-financial-fiscal policies, used as compensatory mechanisms to garner private
sector support. Recently, when market-oriented reforms were introduced, most
compensatory mechanisms disappeared, and interest groups became vocal regarding
exchange rate policy. Institutional continuity and the longevity of the exchange rate regime
suggest that political economy considerations might not be relevant in explaining the
pattern of key  variables. This intuition is not fully supported by the evidence. The rate of
devaluation was lower during the NF and higher during Conservative governments. The
first result supports the fact that political competition might imply less concern for
stability.  The second could be explained by the influence of conservatives in the coffee-
growing region and to their willingness to accelerate the rate of depreciation to correct for
currency overvaluations. The nominal rate of devaluation seems to depend on the nature
of the central bank board. In particular, it has been during the tenure of an independent
central bank that exchange rate policy has been actively used to bring down inflation.
JEL classification number: F33
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I.  Introduction
This paper looks into the political economy forces that helped shape exchange rate policy
in Colombia since the early 1960s.  As witnessed by the remarkable longevity of the
managed crawl, Colombian exchange rate policies since 1967 did not take the form of
major regime changes. Policy shifts came by through variations in the rate of crawl,
varying degrees of administrative restrictions on capital flows and, on occasions, ad-hoc
measures to generate multiple exchange rates.
The basic premise of our analysis is that economic policy in general, and exchange
rate policy in particular, should not be seen exclusively as a function of its intended effects,
but also as the result of the interaction between interest groups, politicians and
bureaucrats, within the context of a set of institutional constraints.  The fact that different
economies --facing similar problems and having comparable resources-- exhibit different
performances cannot be explained solely with analytical frameworks based on the
existence of a social planner.  Macroeconomic optimality is only one of the factors
affecting the choice of exchange rate policy, and one should therefore investigate other
policy determinants (Haggard and Webb, 1994).
The paper has four sections, in addition to the introduction.  In the second we set
out the political environment that prevailed during the period under study. In the third we
describe the main phases in which the 1960-1998 period might be fruitfully divided to
study exchange rate policies, and we discuss the political economy forces that helped
shape policy during these periods. The fourth section empirically addresses the importance
of political/institutional aspects in determining the rate of nominal devaluation and the
level of the real exchange rate.  In the fifth we conclude.  In addition, there are three
appendices. The first one deals with the 1966 confrontation with the IMF; the second with
the persistence of a moderate rate of inflation; the third describes the data.
II.   Some political and institutional background
This section provides a characterization of Colombia’s political environment since the late
1950s.  It is divided into two parts.  In the first we show that, for the most part, the post-
1960 era is one of power sharing between the two historical political parties. In the second
we argue that the polity has been an important factor explaining the lack of extreme
positions in regard to economic policy in general and exchange rate policy in particular.
A.   Three decades of power-sharing
Colombia is, together with Mexico, possibly the country where the party system has least
changed in the Western Hemisphere. According to  Dix (1990, pp. 100), “what does
distinguish the Colombian case is the failure of the country’s political institutions, and
notably its party system, to manifest changes comparable in magnitude to the new levels of
social mobilization.” On average, during the 1945-86 period the two traditional parties
commanded over 97% of the vote for the House of Representatives.  Only once (in 1970)
did this percentage fall below 90. Between 1931 and 1982 only 12% of municipalities
switched party allegiance. Almost without exception, every time dissident factions
appeared, they invariably went back to their original partisan allegiance.- 3 - 3
The non-emergence of a third party is surprising in light of the fact that since the
late 1950s the two traditional ones have converged in terms of policy and ideology.
2
Furthermore, Colombia’s poor distribution of income and wealth made it an ideal place for
the emergence of a class-based party.  However, the workforce has not been heavily
employed in sectors that are prone to produce a militant, class-oriented activism. Quite the
contrary, coffee, the country’s main product, is grown on thousands of small, family-
operated parcels.  This has fostered conservative, individualist values rather than radical or
collectivist ones (Dix, 1990).  On top of that, coffee is entirely owned by nationals, as
have been other key industries.  This might explain the lack of nationalistic attitudes,
frequent breeding grounds for popular movements.
3
Following Dix (1980), since 1958 Colombia can be characterized as a case of a
consociational democracy, unique in that its subcultures do not originate in religious,
ethnic, or class differences.
4  In regard to the two traditional parties, their exclusivist
nature and their familial and communal roots mark them as the functional equivalent of
subcultures.
5
Historically, the two traditional parties have been composed of notables bound
together through  clientelistic relationships, with weak organizations and almost no
programmatic content.
6  They are, nonetheless, effectively multi-class, as the elites have
sought popular support in their partisan competition for government perks.  Furthermore,
the relative openness of the regime –in terms of elections, division of powers and freedom
of the press— granted it reasonable legitimacy among all social groups.
The stronghold on power of the two traditional parties was enhanced in the late
1950s, through a political coalition (National Front or Frente Nacional).  After several
years of party violence, the leaders of the two traditional parties reached an arrangement
by which both would share power for 16 years. The agreement was facilitated by several
factors:  (i) the usual conflict between the parties was being superseded by much higher
stakes, as the masses were becoming increasingly resentful; (ii) the repressive actions of
the military and their political ambitions became more uncomfortable than a coalition with
a partisan foe; (iii) the Liberal’s acceptance that Colombia was a catholic country; (iv)
agreement that the military would not be persecuted and that the Minister of Defense
would come from their ranks.
                                                       
2  This description does not hold after the enactment of a new Political Constitution in 1991.  In fact, in the latter part of the next section
we explore the possible link between the 1994 electoral results and the distinct positions regarding economic policy between the two
traditional parties.
3  Nelson et al. (1971) mention as an additional element the organizational weakness of labor federations and “the hierarchical difference
between them and the entrepreneurial class.” As we shall see below, labor’s inability to promote a political movement did not constrain it
from achieving important sporadic leverage, including the wage hike that deemed the 1962 devaluation a failure.
4  Lijphart (1977, pp. 1) distinguished a consociational democracy as one in which “centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are
counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behavior of the leaders of the different segments of the population.”  By means of
proportionality rules, grand coalitions and mutual vetoes, leaders of different subcultures are able to provide reasonable stability to an
otherwise polarized society.   Other analysts have referred to Colombia as a “modified democracy”, using qualifications such as
“controlled”, “oligarchic” or “bipartisan elitist.”  Some have even called it a “formally authoritarian democracy” or a “constitutional
dictatorship”  (Hartlyn, 1993).
5  Writing in the early 1970s, Nelson et al. (1971, pp. 218, our emphasis) suggested that “the traditional style of Colombian politics
invokes an emotional, moralistic, and tenacious attachment to hereditary loyalties.”
6 According to Supelano (1992), in Colombia there has always been resistance towards the dominant theories of the day. Policy has
generally been eclectic, depending more in the need to maintain the balance of power than on theoretical principles. Dix  (1978) argues that
the lack of ideology is not exclusive of the two traditional parties.  The same can be said of General Rojas’s ANAPO, at least circa 1970,
when it made an important run for the presidency.  A survey of its leaders suggests that their motivations were not ideological.  The
movement was Christian, with Rojas being the candidate more opposed to divorce and birth control.- 4 - 4
The main provisions of the National Front were: (i) the presidency would be
alternated for the duration of the coalition; (ii) all seats in Congress, departmental
assemblies and municipal councils, and all cabinet and government offices, as well as
Supreme Court positions, would be divided in a 50-50 fashion, to the exclusion of all
other parties; (iii) non-procedural decisions in all elective bodies required a two-thirds
majority.
Though it can be criticized for having impeded social change, the National Front
must be credited with having achieved a steep decline in inter-party violence and the return
to barracks of the military.
7 The two parties stopped quarreling for the control of the state,
while reaping the gains of its impressive growth.  Resulting policies fostered stable growth
and moderate inflation, without openly discriminating against any activity.
8  Coffee sector
interests were favorably addressed, and to a lesser degree so were those of other
organizations (Hartlyn, 1993).
9
The National Front formally ended in 1974, but several of its provisions were
extended for four years.
10 Informally, the coalition lasted much longer, with all the
presidents that followed until 1990 being bred within its ranks, while Congress continued
to be dominated by the two traditional parties. A referendum held in 1990 mandated the
convening of a popularly elected Constituent Assembly which drafted a new constitution,
which facilitates the creation and consolidation of new political movements, empowered
citizens, and advanced political and fiscal decentralization. Though many analysts have
been skeptical of its practical implications, the power-sharing schemes of the National
Front did, for all practical purposes, end in 1991.
  
B.  Economic and institutional connotations of the polity
The characterization of Colombia as a consociational democracy, in which since the late
1950s, and at least until 1991, two parties have explicitly or implicitly shared power, can
go a long way in explaining the economic policies that have been implemented.  According
to Haggard (1994, pp. 238), Latin American countries with high inflation histories have
been those in which the “urban popular sector” and labor groups have been incorporated
into populist parties, within the context of relatively polarized party systems. In turn, the
political difficulties of implementing macroeconomic adjustment programs have been less
severe where decision making has been centralized and less subjected to rent-seeking
pressures.
There are two aspects that differentiate Colombia from the typical Latin American
country, as characterized by Haggard.  The most influential business group produces an
exportable (coffee) not linked to import substitution, and export promotion has been the
cornerstone of policy since 1967.  Post-1967 Colombia seems to fit in  Haggard’s
assessment of Asia in the sense that in that region it has been important “to maintain
                                                       
7 Recent violence has occurred outside of any power dispute between the traditional parties, although many of its causes can be traced back
to the exclusivist nature of the National Front.  On these matters, the essays collected in Leal (1995) are very relevant.
8 According to Reveiz and Pérez (1986), during the National Front heads of business associations began to occupy, in a rather large
proportion, positions in the executive branch.
9 In sharp contrast with this interpretation, Bates (1997) argues that being electorally very important, coffee producers have been highly
influential in those periods in which party competition has been significant, but have been subjected to the government’s redistributive
purposes when there was no partisan competition in national elections (i.e. the National Front years).
10 A 1968 Constitutional amendment prolonged parity in cabinet and administrative positions for four years and established that after this
extension the party other than that of the President would receive  “equitable”  cabinet and administrative positions.- 5 - 5
realistic exchange rates and to shift toward the promotion of manufactured exports” (pp.
241).
According to Urrutia (1991), in Colombia there has generally been no “economic
populism”, at least not in the sense of Dornbusch and Edwards (1991).  Macroeconomic
policy has generally been conducted with the purpose of providing some minimum stability
deemed necessary to promote growth, rather than with redistribution purposes. This has
been made possible not by “populism”, but by “clientelism”, which has given politicians an
important say in the distribution of the national budget, while at the same time allowing
them to reap the benefits of stability, produced by a seldom politicized macroeconomic
decision-making process.
As Archer and Soberg Shugart (1997) and Soberg Shugart and Nielson (1997)
show, Colombia’s electoral rules –in which members of Congress are elected by
proportional representation rules applied on each district on factional, rather than on party
lists-- provide incentives for politicians to pursue personal, service-related votes instead of
party-oriented votes.
11  Voters are tied to individual legislators and their vote depends
heavily on the elected official’s delivery of government services.  In addition, parties have
almost no control over the composition of their delegations in Congress. Some three
decades ago, Nelson et al. (1971) argued that National Front political practices were
supplementing the inter-party political and ideological debate with the politics of pressure
groups.
To be sure, in spite of the strong bipartisan coalition, politics does not take place in
a vacuum. Different regions hold different interests, and those interests are better served
by different powers within the state. As a first approximation, it is interesting to
differentiate between the (mainly Andean) coffee-growing region and the rest of the
country.  The former is heavily dependent on a primary export; the latter has a much more
diversified economic base.
Table 1 shows the regional origin of the heads of three key institutions: the
Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank and the National Planning Department. The first is
involved with all economic matters, the second primarily with exchange rate and monetary
policy, and the third with long-term planning and fiscal policy.  The coffee-growing
region, with less than one fourth of population and GDP, has provided 40% of the
Ministers of Finance and Governors of the Central Bank, but only 22% of the Directors of
the National Planning Department.
As was just pointed out, until 1990 both houses of Congress were apportioned by
proportional representation.  Table 2 shows that, as a result, the regional origin of
senators and representatives was very similar to the regional distribution of the population.
However, the 1994 Senate elections were based on proportional representation at the
national level.  The last two columns of the table indicate that the Caribbean region
became over represented in the senate, at the expense, among others, of the coffee
growing and pacific regions.
Table 3 contains information regarding abstention during the 1990 elections. For
the presidential election, abstention in the coffee-growing region was in line with the
national average, and much lower than in the Caribbean region. However, in congressional
                                                       
11  The 1991 Constitution maintained this rules for the lower house of Congress.  To facilitate matters for political minorities, Senate seats
are now assigned by proportional representation rules applied in a national electoral district.- 6 - 6
elections abstention was much lower in the Caribbean region than in the country as a
whole. It can be argued that the Caribbean region is a very active political actor in
congressional elections, whose outcome is crucial in the formulation and distribution of
the budget, but much less important in presidential elections, whose outcome is critical in
the design of overall macroeconomic policy (including, until 1991, all matters related to
exchange rate and monetary policy).
There is no doubt that all regions and economic interests are concerned with all
types of economic policies, from the more technical issues of monetary and exchange rate
management, to the more political aspects of fiscal policy.  However, Tables 1-3 give
some support to the idea that certain regions and economic interest are more concerned
with certain types of policies, and are therefore more interested in politically capturing the
institutions that undertake them.
That is to say, regardless of the fact that Colombia has had remarkable stability in
economic policy and notorious longevity in the case of several key institutions (see
below), it is still the case that the latter are run by people, and that those people better
reflect the interests of certain regions and economic activities.  In particular, the all-
important coffee-growing region seems to be much more active in presidential politics –
key in determining exchange rate policy—than in congressional politics –crucial in the
elaboration and distribution of the budget.
1.  Relative economic stability
Within the Latin American context, Colombia has been characterized as the least volatile
economy. Table 4 provides information on inflation and growth for the region’s largest
economies. In all sub-periods, Colombia had the third lowest inflation rate. In terms of
volatility, except during 1960-69, it had the most stable rate of inflation.  A similar pattern
emerges in the case of the rate of growth.  The table indicates that Colombia’s relative
stability occurred in the context of macroeconomic results that were not particularly
impressive.
Economic volatility depends on several factors, prominent among them external
conditions (i.e. terms of trade and capital flows) and economic policy.  For a slightly
different set of countries, Table 5 shows that with regard to the terms of trade, Colombia’s
“external environment” has not been particularly stable.  Instead, during 1970-92
Colombia had by far the most stable economic policy of the region’s 22 countries under
analysis by the IDB (1995).
It is important to acknowledge that in the context of this paper stability has a very
precise dimension.  With regard to prices, Colombia is a remarkable case of stability of  the
rate of inflation.
12  The fact that relative stability has been achieved in the context of
moderate, rather than low inflation is not independent of political economy issues, since
there is evidence that the inflation tax has helped finance the deficit, in itself partially the
                                                       
12  Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) refer to Colombia as the  moderate-inflation country par excellence.  In the words of Williamson
(1996, pp. 34), “Colombia provided the best example of a country that seemed to have learned to live with inflation .” See Appendix 2 for
more details on this matter.- 7 - 7
result of the resolution of conflicts among relevant economic and political interests within
society.
13
2.  Institutional continuity
Table 6 shows the phases of central banking in Colombia.  Banco de la República was
established as private and autonomous entity in 1923, and it remained so until 1963.  Up
to 1931 Colombia adhered to the gold standard.  It then maintained a fixed (and stable)
exchange rate until 1949. In 1951 the bank’s objectives were expanded, to include not
only price stability but also  “economic development.” In the early 1960s the bank was
nationalized and in 1963 the Monetary Board was created.  Conformed solely by members
of the government and by the government-appointed governor, the Board was given
control of monetary, credit and exchange rate policies.
14
The 1991 Constitution completely overhauled the central banking regime.  The
Banco de la  República was organized as an autonomous state institution, independent
from the government, with the sole objective of achieving price stability.  Its Board of
Directors is in charge of monetary, credit and exchange rate policies.  It is composed of
seven members: the Governor of the Bank, the Minister of Finance and five full-time
members, appointed for a fixed term by the government, in a staggered fashion.
In 1967 Colombia adopted a “crawling peg” exchange rate system.  Whatever is
said regarding stability in Colombia’s key economic variables has to take into account the
fact that since 1967, and at least until 1991, it maintained the same exchange rate regime.
15
The stability of the exchange rate regime has coincided with notorious institutional
stability. Table 7 shows that since 1960 the central bank has had only 6 governors, with an
average tenure of 6.5 years, well above the regional average suggested in Table 8,
borrowed from (Cukierman, 1992). If the tenure of the central bank governor has been
notorious, it pales in comparison to that of the General Manager of the National
Federation of Coffee Growers (Fedecafé, the Federación Nacional de  Cafeteros).  Since
1937, Fedecafé has had only three general managers.
3.   The coffee revenue distribution mechanism
During the first half of the 20
th century coffee producers and the government realized that
it was in their mutual interest to stabilize the coffee revenue stream.  To do so, two
interrelated decisions were jointly adopted.  In the external front, Colombia decided to
vigorously support multilateral agreements seeking to regulate prices and quantities in the
world coffee market through the International Coffee Agreement (ICA). In the domestic
front, since the 1940s the government and the coffee sector embarked on a revenue
stabilization scheme. Under this mechanism, the government taxed coffee exports at
variable rates, broadly related to world prices and the exchange rate, and transferred the
resulting collections to a stabilization fund (the National Coffee Fund, or FNC),
                                                       
13  Suescún (1992) shows that Colombia’s inflation and devaluation rates exhibit the time-series properties derived from an “optimal
financing” model (Phelps, 1973).  On the uses of the inflation tax, see Steiner  et al. (1992).and Carrasquilla (1996).
14  As we mention in III below, the Board’s actual role in the formulation of exchange rate policy was rather limited.
15  It is revealing to note that in 1987 the central bank organized a very well attended international seminar to commemorate the 20 years
of the Estatuto Cambiario, the 1967 piece of legislation that laid the foundation for the crawling peg system.- 8 - 8
administered by  Fedecafé.
16 In turn,  Fedecafé used FNC’s resources to finance stock
accumulation during periods of high world supplies, and to guarantee a minimum price to
producers when world prices were low.  Collections over and above those needed for
these purposes were held by the FNC in assets of varying liquidity or used to finance
social and infrastructure projects in Colombia’s coffee regions. In periods of very high
world prices, government and coffee growers agreed to pass-on to the Treasury part of
the revenues.
The FNC was broadly successful in its stabilization role. The relation between
prices paid to producers and external prices determine an implicit exchange rate applicable
to coffee. During 1950-1988 this implicit rate was more stable than the general effective
real exchange rate (Ocampo, 1989). Prices paid to coffee-growers, rather than the
exchange rate, became the politically sensitive variable affecting coffee-producing
households.
17 Of course, the sustainability of a high price to producers is enhanced
through a weak exchange rate.
This highlights the fact that the coffee sector could obtain a desired goal by
adjustments in other variables as long as the exchange rate was not excessively out of line.
When the latter did occur --jeopardizing the  FNCs financial stability— the coffee sector
became quite vocal.  It is an indication that coffee sector representatives had ways of
obtaining stable  effective  exchange rates without getting themselves involved in the
sensitive issues surrounding exchange rate policy ( Urrutia, 1981). Probably Nelson et al.
(1971, pp. 251) put it best: “the coffee sector will be more inclined to use its political
influence to change the domestic support price an the exchange rate differential –specific
coffee sector policy—than to lobby for a higher exchange rate structure, a strategy that
would put it in direct conflict with other special interest groups.”
4.  The role of technocrats
Some authors have emphasized the role of “technocrats” in Colombia’s economic
decision-making process.   To be sure, that was not always the case.  Rivera (1976)
persuasively argues that in the early 1960s Colombian technocrats were not considered as
valuable as their Latin American counterparts.  When during the  Lleras administration
(1966-1970) their role in policy-making was enhanced, they were vehemently antagonized
by politicians.
Edwards (1995, pp. 117, our translation and emphasis) has also highlighted the
role of “technocrats” in explaining Colombia’s relative economic stability. According to
him “Fedesarrollo (a private research institution) has been the intellectual breeding ground
of an amazingly large number of those in charge of economic policy.  It could be argued
that  Fedesarrollo’s bipartisan and non-ideological positions is a good reflection of
Colombia’s implicit pact according to which Liberals and Conservatives share power.”
                                                       
16 This is a very schematized explanation. Taxes on coffee exports took various (frequently complicated) forms, ranging from less
favorable exchange rates applicable to coffee exports to direct taxes accruing to the National Treasury, charged on an ad- valorem basis.
Other taxes were levied on coffee production or exports, earmarked to be used solely in the country’s coffee-growing regions.  Finally,
there was the “retención cafetara” (retention), a charge applied to coffee exports.  In principle, it was designed to finance coffee stocks as a
result of ICA, but in practice had a wider practical scope,  i..e. to absorb changes in external prices and in the exchange rate, when domestic
coffee prices were fixed.   
17   This fact notwithstanding,  Cárdenas and  Partow (1998) have recently provided some econometric evidence in the sense that the
domestic price of coffee does not depend on electoral or partisan cycles.- 9 - 9
Fedesarrollo has been home to many of Colombia’s policy-makers. More
interesting than its clout, is its non-partisan orientation. Of its nine Directors, 5 have been
Liberals, 3 Conservatives, and 1 independent  (Table 9). In all instances but one, the
Director has had a different party affiliation from that of the government in place during
his tenure. It is the same people, sometimes acting as government officials, sometimes as
independent analysts.  It can be argued that the institution is a facilitator for achieving
consensus, not because of its intellectual power, but rather because it credibly internalizes
policy options that are politically viable.
For better or for worse, Colombian economic technocrats, irrespective of party
affiliation, have frequently been inclined to reach broad consensus on economic policy
among themselves.  For example, in early 1978, during the peak of the coffee boom and in
the midst of a huge accumulation of reserves, the Colombian Bankers Association held a
symposium.  Wiesner (1978) reports that of the seventeen young economists who
expressed their views during the discussions, only one of them hinted at the convenience
of doing away with exchange controls.  The rest, in one way or another, endorsed the then
accepted economic policy paradigm: without exchange controls the economy would
repeatedly enter into stop-go cycles that would curtail growth, hamper export oriented
industries and promote capital flight. The voices of these economists were not simply
those of academia.  Of the seventeen speakers, six would eventually become finance
ministers, three would hold ministries in other economic areas, and seven would become
either advisors to the monetary board or members of it successor institution, the central
bank board.  Only in the 1990s is this trend towards consensus starting to dissipate.
5.  Labor unions
Colombia’s labor movement does not appear to be very important. While in 1965 close to
16% of the labor force belonged to a labor organization, that number dropped to 9.3% in
1984 and to only 7.8% in 1990. Affiliation numbers are small, and have barely increased
(Table 10).
In 1990 the economic activity with the highest percentage of workers belonging to
a labor union was “utilities” (at that time, basically “public utilities”), with an affiliation
rate of 42%. Affiliation rates were as low as 1.5% in agriculture and 8.2% in
manufacturing. The importance of the labor movement is restricted to the public sector,
and even there, percentages have been declining (Table 11).
Of course, the actual relevance of organized labor might be different from what is
suggested by affiliation numbers. In that respect,  Wiesner  (1998) argues that the rent-
seeking practices of organized labor in key public sector services –health and, especially,
education—have played a crucial role in retarding much needed structural reforms.
III.  Exchange rate policy phases
This section focuses on the economics of exchange rate policy and on political economy
issues that influenced it since the 1960s. We argue that the stability of the exchange rate
regime after 1967 was systematically accompanied by the “fine-tuning” of other variables,
and that when stability was not justified by economic conditions, its maintenance was the
result of compromises to shelter affected groups. Because of the polity and the institutions
described above, these compromises could be made in a rather credible manner.- 10 - 10
A.  Real exchange rate phases
Figure 1 reports an index of the real effective exchange rate for Colombia between 1962
and 1997. There, it is apparent that since the early 1960s there were broadly two periods
when the general trend of the exchange rate was to depreciate (1962-70, and 1983-90)
and another two when the general trend was to appreciate (1970-82, and 1990-onwards).
Figure 2 shows the corresponding rate of nominal devaluation.  In what follows, we
analyze these main phases and discuss the reaction of the private sector to exchange rate
management.
Phase 1: The 1960’s.  Instability and exchange controls
Until 1967 export earnings instability and shortcomings in domestic policies periodically
led to the abandonment of the exchange rate peg and to attempts at establishing a new
parity.  During the 1960s Colombia experienced three such episodes. The unsatisfactory
results of the first two paved the way to the adoption of less ad-hoc approaches to
exchange rate management.
The first episode took place in 1962.  A significant real appreciation accumulated
over several years and the necessity for a parity adjustment was evident. The form that the
adjustment was to take led to heated discussions, both in Congress and within the
administration. After several months, the adjustment was finally made, accompanied by
loose monetary policy and an increase in wages pushed by the Labor Minister.  Inflation
eliminated most of the effects of the parity change.
18 Memories of the 1962 mess were to
linger-on for a long time, complicating the handling of the following crisis, as summarized
by Diaz-Alejandro (1976, pp. 195):
“…it can easily be seen why memories of [the devaluation’s] impact were a major
obstacle facing those attempting after that date to use a more flexible exchange
rate as a policy tool.  The argument that the event was a textbook example of how
not to manage a devaluation made little impression. The feelings of most
Colombians were accurately reflected by the then President Valencia, who
throughout 1963 and 1964 would warn his economic advisors not to mention the
abominable word in his presence...”
The second episode took place in 1965-66. Despite persistent foreign exchange shortages,
the central bank defended a fixed rate, while simultaneously expanding domestic credit.
19
The resulting loss of reserves became unsustainable, leading to the adoption of
increasingly stringent quantitative import restrictions. In October 1964 the central bank
decided to let the market determine the rate, which depreciated by almost 90 percent, only
to be fixed again in the second half of 1965.  QRs were again eliminated and tariffs raised
to curb import demand. A stand-by arrangement was agreed upon with the IMF.
                                                       
18 Congress compounded the damage by granting general wage increases over and above those decreed by the executive branch.  Despite
the upsurge in inflation, for the whole of 1963  real wage rates were 7 percent above those for 1962.   See Diaz-Alejandro (1976) and
Ocampo et. al. (1987).
19 Among the main components of this expansion in domestic credit were loans to  Fedecafé (Gómez,  1978).- 11 - 11
By mid 1966, when the Lleras administration (1966-70) took office, practically all
imports had been freed from licensing requirements and an import boom had ensued. With
coffee prices declining, a large current account deficit had again developed.
20  The stand-
by reserve target was not met and the IMF pressed for a new devaluation. The 1962 fiasco
was still fresh in the minds of the new policy-makers, who feared that without effective
monetary and fiscal instruments a new parity change would simply initiate another stop-go
cycle (López, 1987a).  The end result was the breakdown of negotiations with the Fund.
The President moved to muster domestic support for the administration’s position, issued
emergency legislation imposing comprehensive exchange controls and re-established  QRs.
He then persuaded Congress to grant him authority to legislate on exchange rate matters.
21
On March 22, 1967, the  Lleras administration issued Decree-Law 444 --the “exchange
statute” as it came to be known--- which would become the basic legislation governing
exchange rate policy over the next quarter century.
The new exchange rate regime imposed far-reaching controls. All foreign exchange
receipts had to be surrendered to the central bank, which in turn sold them only to those
showing an “acceptable need.” The multiple exchange rate schemes were replaced by a
unified rate that would be in place for the next 9 years.
22 In their place, more transparent
mechanisms were adopted: the exchange rate differential for coffee was substituted for an
ad-valorem tax; direct subsidies were granted to non-traditional exports; and a subsidized
credit scheme, funded with a surtax on imports, was directed at non-traditional exports.
The nominal exchange rate was moved in tandem with declining inflation rates, achieved
through fiscal discipline and monetary policy. As the real exchange rate depreciated, non-
traditional exports surged, imports were reined-in, and the balance of payments delivered
surpluses. Growth rebounded to over 6 percent per year. Although protection for
domestic production increased in comparison to the levels of 1966, import substitution
policies were placed on a back burner.
Phase 2.  The 1970s.  Coffee boom and capital inflows
In July 1975 cold weather in Brazil destroyed coffee crops, causing world prices to
increase five-fold, suddenly rendering the peso undervalued at the existing (managed)
exchange rate. The government opposed an exchange rate policy shift as it viewed the
shock as short term. Exchange and import restrictions were thus maintained, while other
policies were geared to increase savings and to sterilize the increase in reserves.
23  The
political decision to pass on the boom proceeds to coffee growers through higher domestic
coffee prices ---a variable traditionally controlled by the government--- rendered the policy
course untenable.
24 Pressure on the domestic currency to appreciate was accentuated by
the increasing supply of external capital made available through the recycling of  the
surpluses of oil exporting countries.
                                                       
20 Imports increased 39% in 1966;  the current account deficit reached 5.3% of GDP ( García-García and Jayasuriya, 1997).
21 A detailed account of the evolution of  the debates in Congress is presented in  López  (1987c).
22 A temporary two-tier system was initially established: one for  most transactions, which was adjusted periodically and another, limited to
capital transactions, which was fixed at a more depreciated level.  It was agreed that when the two rates coincided, the two-tier system
would disappear, which occurred 15 months later.
23 Banco de la República, August, 1976.
24 This policy decision was summarized in a single phrase,  made famous by then President  López:  “La bonanza es de los cafeteros” (“The
boom is for the coffee-growers”).  In time, policy would have to part from this dictum.  See Ocampo and Revéiz (1980).- 12 - 12
To deal with the policy contradictions, multiple exchange rates were once again
put in place, with a more competitive rate applied to non-traditional exports, while a vast
array of administrative controls was implemented to deal with rising inflation and capital
inflows.
25 Inflation surpassed the 30 percent threshold in early 1977, and continued to
over 40 percent by mid-year. Tight monetary policy attracted even more capital inflows,
which the central bank attempted to keep at bay by cumbersome administrative restrictions
on foreign borrowing.
26  The vast array of direct intervention measures, complemented by
a dose of fiscal restraint, finally arrested the momentum of inflation. A clear signal had
been delivered in the sense that the government would not tolerate a dramatic increase in
inflation. In all, between 1975 and early 1978, the coffee boom led to a real appreciation
of the peso of over 20 percent.
27
By 1978 coffee prices had declined, but income from coffee exports remained high
as Colombia’s export volumes increased significantly ( Caballero, 1987).
28 Currency
appreciation continued to be reinforced by abundant financial resources in international
markets and by Colombia’s increasing involvement in illicit drug markets ( García-García
and  Jayasuriya, 1997). The administration that took office in 1978 finally viewed the
abundance of foreign exchange as a longer-term occurrence, and moved towards a more
liberal trade regime, a position consistent with the objective of increasing public
investment, financed with external credit. The higher levels of public investment
deteriorated the fiscal position, from virtual equilibrium in 1978 to a 6% of GDP deficit in
1982. As  QRs were reduced, imports reached record highs and the current account
changed from a surplus of 1.4% of GDP in 1978 to a 7.4% deficit in 1982.  In the
meantime, GDP growth declined from almost 8.5% in 1978 to less than 1% in 1982.
Phase 3.   The 1980s.  The debt crisis
In August 1982, only weeks before the Mexican foreign debt moratorium, the
administration led by conservative  Betancur (1982-86) took office in the midst of the
significant slowdown in economic activity. High on the new government’s agenda was to
“jump-start” the economy, without acknowledging that a fundamental change in the
external economic environment had taken place with the virtual shutdown of international
capital markets and that, under the new circumstances, the financing of the twin fiscal and
external deficits was not viable.
29  Not surprisingly, the central bank began to rapidly loose
reserves.
                                                       
25 For a steadfast defense of this policy mix, see Sarmiento (1978).
26  QRs were maintained, under the pretext that low import price  elasticities precluded the search for domestic price stability by
increasing the availability of foreign goods ( Sarmiento, 1978).
27 Almost a decade later, during 1986, world coffee prices again surged, propelled this time by droughts in Brazil. This sudden change
again moved the fundamentals in the direction of a more appreciated currency.  On this occasion, however, and in contrast with the 1975-
77 episode, a clearer agreement was reached between the government and the coffee growers to avoid drastic increases in domestic coffee
prices. The coffee sector’s resulting surplus was thus largely saved, and its financial counterpart was invested in medium term government-
backed securities.  As a result, domestic spending was kept in check and the exchange rate did not significantly appreciate as had happened
in 1977-78.
28 High domestic prices provided the incentive to modernize coffee plantations, to apply increasing amounts of labor for crop maintenance
and to intensify the use of fertilizers.  As a result, production went from about 8 million 60k bags in 1975 to about 13 million in 1980 and
exports from about 7 to 11 million bags over the same period.  See Junguito and Pizano  (1991).
29 As had been the case since 1978.  In an article extraordinary for its candor, Hugo  Palacios, then central bank governor, presents a lucid
assessment of  the policy miscalculations made at the time by the government’s leading policy-makers.  See  Palacios  (1997).- 13 - 13
The real exchange rate had appreciated significantly between 1975 and the early
1980s (see Fig. 1). By late 1982 there was no clear decision as to the preferred policy
course. As explained by Montenegro (1997) and  Palacios (1997), many analysts were
recommending expansionary policies. For example,  Fedesarrollo insisted on the need for
fiscal stimulus, and the planning department advocated the mobilization of resources
towards housing construction. Only a few scattered voices in the private sector, and fewer
still within the public sector, insisted on the need to pursue a major parity adjustment,
before attempting to stimulate aggregate demand.
  As external credit dried up and the economy came to a virtual standstill, pressure
mounted to facilitate resources to ease the cash flow problems of many (particularly
industrial) firms. The Monetary Board made available subsidized credit that would be
largely used by the private sector to pay debts abroad and by many to take long positions
in dollars. The policy was a self-inflicted wound that accelerated the loss of reserves. The
central bank publicly expressed its preference for a gradual correction of the overvaluation
through an increase in the rate of crawl, and favored export subsidies and  QRs as
temporary mechanisms until competitiveness was restored.
30 Reflecting the economic
slowdown, the fiscal accounts deteriorated, despite a major tax hike. As external credits
dwindled, the central bank moved to further restrict sales of foreign exchange for all but
the most basic needs.
In early 1984 it had become evident that without the support of international
financial institutions, external credit sources would remain unavailable. The administration
thus modified the policy course drastically, engineering a significant fiscal adjustment; a
monitoring agreement was reached with the IMF. Export subsidies were sharply reduced,
while the rate of crawl was accelerated. By end 1985 the real exchange rate had
depreciated by over 30 percent, commercial credit flows were normalized, reserves began
to increase and restrictions on imports were gradually reduced to pre-crisis levels. A
moratorium on Colombia’s external debt was avoided.
Phase 4.  The 1990s.  The resurgence of capital inflows
After the 1985 adjustment, the real exchange rate remained rather stable until mid 1989,
when the collapse of the ICA led policy-makers to expect a sharp decline in coffee prices,
and suggested the need for a more depreciated rate. Also, the government saw the need to
reduce opposition to the lifting of QRs by seeking a weaker currency. As a result, the rate
of crawl was accelerated while the government committed to tighten fiscal policy and to
gradually liberalize trade. In the event, the fiscal stance was not as restrained as agreed
upon, and trade liberalization moved at a slower pace than had been envisaged.
Furthermore, since 1989 capital markets continued to brush aside the debt crisis.
Resources became increasingly available and return capital began its comeback. The
authorities were slow to acknowledge this external environment. Furthermore, coffee
exports did not decline, as increased volumes compensated for the decline in prices.
Consequently, while market forces were moving in the direction of a real appreciation of
the currency, the government and the central bank were seeking to depreciate. Not unlike
                                                       
30 President Betancur, the Labor Minister during the 1962 devaluation-cum-wage inflation debacle, was rather reticent to consider an
exchange rate adjustment.- 14 - 14
what had happened in 1975, the real appreciation came about through an acceleration of
inflation.
Structural reforms also tended to appreciate the peso. First came the authorization
of a “free” market for foreign exchange transactions below a certain limit. Although the
“official” market continued to operate, the existence of a non-regulated segment
effectively eliminated the reach of exchange controls. Then came the approval of a fiscal
amnesty for capital resources held abroad by Colombian nationals.
31  These changes
promoted the repatriation of flight capital. Finally, trade liberalization, which should have
depreciated the equilibrium exchange rate, temporarily produced the opposite effect, as
the announcement of  gradual reductions in tariffs prompted importers to postpone their
purchases abroad.
Capital inflows continued to exert pressure on the exchange rate. By end 1991 it
had become evident that the policy of sterilized intervention was futile, as the fiscal
adjustment that may have made it a workable proposition was not forthcoming.
32  In order
to generate a nominal appreciation, the authorities, again as in 1977, made use of
exchange certificates. Intervention points established by the central bank in its transactions
in the market for certificates created a de-facto exchange rate band, and in early 1994 a
band was explicitly adopted.
33
B.  Private sector reactions to exchange rate management
Throughout the period analyzed here, reactions to similar exchange rate policies by
different sectors at different times, often reflected the presence, or lack thereof, of
measures to compensate for direct adverse effects of the policies. For example, during the
1970s compensatory measures were adopted in favor of the industrial sector (via
preferential access to external credit), of non-traditional exports (via a preferential
exchange rate), and of the agricultural sector (via access to subsidized local credit), while
these sectors received little relief or preferential treatment during the 1990s. As noted in
what follows, their reactions to similar exchange rate policies sharply differed reflecting
this fact.
The manufacturing sector. During the coffee boom of the 1970’s, the industrial’s
association, ANDI, did not take a position regarding the exchange rate level, largely
because the rate affected industrial firms differently. Rather, it sought protection for
domestic production through import tariffs and,  above all, through quantitative import
restrictions, while aggressively pushing for the use of direct subsidies and drawback
mechanisms for exporting firms. ANDI repeatedly warned against an “indiscriminate”
import liberalization and pushed for an industrial policy that would completely free
imports of capital goods, while imposing tariffs and strict  QRs on consumer goods.
34
ANDI’s demands largely coincided with government policy at least until 1979, and this
was reflected in the industrial sector’s backing of economic policy during the second half
of the 1970’s.
                                                       
31  The ethical implications of this policy were questioned, but in general the approach received acceptance.  Nevertheless, the possibility
that such a mechanism could serve as a means to launder drug related resources was a far more serious matter.
32 Although the overall public sector deficit did not increase,  public expenditures did so rather significantly, from 23.7% of GDP in 1990
to 26.9% in 1992 and 27.6% in 1994.   
33 The band had a width of 7.5 percentage points above and below a mid-point rate and was depreciated at a pre-announced rate.
34 See particularly ANDI’s Revista (24-27 of 1975;  28 and 32 of 1976).- 15 - 15
The manufacturing sector’s preferences on economic policies, however, did not
seem to keep pace with changing circumstances. By 1984, almost two years into the debt
crisis, ANDI insisted on further fiscal stimulus and warned against the “perils of fiscal
adjustment.” It advocated an expansion of public spending financed by the central bank,
arguing that the decline in reserves created “room” for central bank credit.
35 The policy
advocated by the industrial sector was exactly the same it had advocated (and the
government adopted) during the reserve build-up of 1976-79.
36 Despite this, during the
first two years of the Betancur administration, with a looming balance of payments crisis,
ANDI’s proposals were largely implemented.
During the first stages of the import liberalization process initiated in 1989, the
industrial sector again favored existing restrictions and repeatedly expressed its opposition
to the idea that QRs could be replaced by a new tariff structure with a more depreciated
exchange rate. The idea of permitting the exchange rate to replace direct protection to
local production was frowned upon.  This downplaying of exchange rate policy ended
when, after 1991, the industrial sector was longer able to maintain import liberalization at
bay. From then on, the sector became very vocal in arguing for a “competitive” exchange
rate.
37
The coffee growers.  During the peso’s real appreciation in the second half of the
1970’s, coffee producers supported exchange rate management and did not resist the
creation of a dual exchange rate scheme designed to curtail part of their windfall.  To
some extent this reflected the fact that the sector’s exports were the main cause of the
peso’s real appreciation.  However, as explained in section IA3 above, coffee growers,
rather than arguing for a preferred exchange rate policy, concentrated their lobbying
efforts in affecting other variables that directly affected their income. In contrast, by the
end of 1991, when further adjustments to non-exchange rate variables were no longer
possible because of the breakdown of the international coffee agreement,  Fedecafé
decided to voice concern over the persistent appreciation. This concern was again
manifested in 1993, as the financial situation of the FNC continued to deteriorate, and in
1996, for the first time in decades,  Fedecafé adopted an explicit position regarding
exchange rate policy. In their words, the appreciation was “the most serious threat ever
faced by the coffee industry.”
38 Fedecafé’s’ policy proposal amounted to a return to the
regime prevailing before 1991 and requested temporary subsidies.
39 More remarkable than
the policy proposal as such was the fact that  Fedecafé modified its traditional low key
attitude regarding exchange rate policy.
The non-coffee export sector. During the 1970’s appreciation period, exporters of
non-traditional goods (associated through ANALDEX) were not vocal on exchange rate
management. This silence was due largely to the policies by which the government
                                                       
35 See Montenegro (1997), particularly in reference to the position adopted by Fedesarrollo.
36 One exception was their proposal to restructure external public debt and to grant government guarantees on private debt. None of these
proposals prospered: public sector debt would be refinanced on a voluntary basis and private sector debt was handled through a mechanism
by which exchange rate risk was removed and replaced by a domestic interest rate risk. The mechanism was applicable only to those debts
that banks voluntarily agreed to restructure, and did not convey a public guarantee on the obligations.
37 ANDI, issue 107, 1991.
38 Informe del Gerente de la Federación Nacional de Cafeteros al Congreso Cafetero, December, 1996.
39 Fedecafé noted that historically during periods of high coffee prices, the coffee sector had made huge transfers of resources to the rest of
the economy. It was now time, they argued not without reason, for reciprocity, noting the difficult situation faced by the FNC while
elsewhere (i.e. oil) there was an evident boom.- 16 - 16
attempted to shield non-traditional exports from the appreciating peso. Like ANDI, non-
coffee exporters showed a clear preference for subsidies, which they obtained either
through the budget or by way of preferential exchange rates.
40 ANALDEX did become
critical of exchange rate management during the 1990s, consistently arguing in favor of a
more depreciated currency
41, when the Government adopted a market oriented policies
that dismantled existing subsidy schemes.
The agricultural sector. The non-coffee agricultural sector did not follow the
protectionist preferences of the industrial sector. The differences between the two sectors
regarding exchange rate policy followed the patterns one would expect a-priori: a
preference for protection by the relatively inefficient import substitution sector in contrast
with an emphasis on cost controls and efficiency advocated by the more export oriented
agricultural sector. Thus, in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the farmer’s association
(SAC) openly advocated a more depreciated exchange rate as the way to recoup
competitiveness, and noted that the sustainability of that policy depended on fiscal
restraint. In contrast to ANDI, the agricultural sector questioned the benefits of import
restrictions, envisaging the anti-export bias of such a policy, and expressed skepticism
regarding subsidies as an alternative to a competitive exchange rate. SAC also advocated a
strong anti-inflation stance. In a similar fashion SAC became increasingly critical in the
1990s of the peso’s real appreciation.  SAC argued that controls should have been
imposed on capital inflows to halt the appreciation trend and noted, with reason, that
revenues from illicit drug exports were being brought into the country through the capital
account.
42
Financial sector. Perhaps as a result of the draconian restrictions imposed by DL
444 of 1967 by which al capital flows were severely restricted for over a quarter century,
the banker’s association (Asociación  Bancaria (AB)
43) seldom expressed its voice
regarding exchange rate management, except perhaps through papers or conferences of an
academic nature. When exchange controls were lifted in the 1990’s, AB became more
vocal regarding exchange rate management. In commenting on the peso’s appreciation,
the banker’s association pointed out that if “fundamentals” had appreciated the real
exchange rate, then government policy was correct in allowing part of the adjustment to
be done through nominal appreciation (with certificates of exchange), and not solely
through inflation.  However, it was critical of attempts at curtailing capital inflows by
establishing a ceiling on interest rates. The association argued that such a policy would
exacerbate appreciation expectations, stimulating capital inflows even more.
The central bank also changed its declared policy stance
44 policy stance during the
1990’s. For the first time in decades, the bank asserted that the preservation of the real
exchange rate would not continue being as primary an objective of exchange rate policy.
In the bank’s view, its new charter, by placing price stability as the bank’s primary
                                                       
40 Another reason why exporters were not vocal about the overvalued peso was that many of them were highly indebted in foreign
currency (Urrutia, 1981).
41 They argued, for example, that interest rates and public sector tariffs --which did not enter into the price calculations used to estimate the
real exchange rate, but which had increased more than general inflation- were significant costs confronted by exporters .
42  It is noteworthy that the issue of illicit drug money was very seldom mentioned as a contributing factor to the peso’s appreciation,
despite the fact that yearly revenues from this trade probably amounted to 5% of GDP during the 1980s and 2-3% in the early 1990s
(Steiner, 1998).
43   Revista Banca y Finanzas, no. 20 (April 1991) and no. 23 (January 1992).
44 Whether the decalred and actual policy stances concided or not is another issue.- 17 - 17
objective, precluded an active exchange rate management seeking to preserve the real
exchange rate.
45
At this point, two questions arise. Given Colombia’s tradition of moving very
cautiously in the reform policy front, how was it possible to implement the ambitious
reform program of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which apparently did away with many
compensating mechanisms?  And second, how was it possible to have a significant real
exchange rate appreciation, without using compensatory mechanisms, as had been the case
in previous experiences?
With regard to the first question, interesting insights appear in Edwards (1998).
He mentions several reasons why President  Gaviria embarked on a structural reform
program:  (i) even though Colombia was not in the midst of an economic crisis, it was
going through severe political and social turmoil, as warfare with leftist guerrilla’s
intensified, and as drug-traffickers went on an all-out terrorist rampage. In that sense,
Colombia complied with the crisis-as-a-prerequisite-to-reform argument [Bates and
Krueger (1993) and Williamson (1994)]; (ii) multilateral institutions, for a change, were
indeed highly influential, in particular in promoting import liberalization; and (iii) on closer
look, the reform process was quite incomplete, and in certain aspects tailored to shield
important interest groups.
46
With regard to the second question, two issues are worth highlighting.  First,
restrictions emanating from GATT curtailed the possibility of using subsidies as a
compensating mechanism for a strong exchange rate, and that was a publicly
acknowledged constraint.  Second, and more importantly, the appreciation of the early
1990s came after the substantial and deliberate weakening of the peso in 1989 and 1990
(Cárdenas and Steiner, 1997).  As mentioned above, the under-valuation of the peso was
an integral part of trade liberalization since its very beginning. Of course, any subsequent
appreciation is more palatable if the starting point is a weak currency.
IV.  Quantitative analysis and evidence
Having described the polity in Section II, the economics and the political economy
responses in Section III, in this section we econometrically explore the determinants –both
economic and political—of exchange rate policy in Colombia.
In the Colombian context, there are several studies regarding the determinants of
the real exchange rate, and even a few regarding the determinants of the nominal exchange
rate.  A recent summary of the most relevant ones appears in  Cárdenas (1997).  While
nominal variables such as relative money supplies between Colombia and the US or
relative price indexes satisfactorily explain the nominal exchange rate, real variables such
as the terms of trade and relative factor productivity explain variations in the real exchange
rate (RER).  These results are, of course, clearly supported by several theories on
exchange rate determination.
                                                       
45 Changes extended to the monetary Board. In the minutes of the Monetary Board corresponding to late 1991, a discussion of exchange
rate policy is documented.  More noteworthy than the issues discussed, was the fact that the issue was a matter of deliberation. Since the
creation of the Board in 1963, exchange rate policy discussions were traditionally held between the Governor of the central bank and the
Minister of Finance but were seldom, if ever, a matter analyzed within the Board.
46 Many public servants –including the powerful teacher’s and oil sector unions-- were excluded from labor reform.  Second, pension
reform did not do away with the public pension fund. Third, tariffs on key agricultural products are now determined through a “price band”
mechanism, with tariffs increasing as world prices decline. Fourth, the central bank was granted independence, but the Finance Minister is
the President of its Board of Directors.- 18 - 18
The most important econometric work regarding political determinants of
economic outcomes is that of Escobar (1996).  He focuses on the political business cycle
governing fiscal and monetary policy, not explicitly addressing issues of exchange rate
management. Moreno (1998) reports that the real exchange rate seems to follow a
political business cycle, appreciating throughout a presidential period. He does not
perform a similar analysis for the nominal exchange rate, which is, after all, the control
variable.  Both authors use annual data (1950-1995), perhaps not the ideal frequency to
analyze political business cycle issues (see below).
47
The purpose of this section is to complement the usual approach to exchange rate
determination by including, in addition to the usual “fundamental” variables, others that
should capture elements of political economy.  In most cases, we will use dummy variables
–i.e. to distinguish between a Liberal and a Conservative government.  In others we will
use continuous variables –i.e. the “fiscal incentive to depreciate” (see below).
The section is divided into three parts.  In the first we briefly summarize some
analytical considerations regarding the political economy of economic policy in regard to
nominal variables. In the second we focus on the statistical description --across different
political/institutional phases-- of the dependent variables and of some plausible
explanatory variables. In the third part we present the results of the econometric
estimations.
The second part, in conjunction with section III above, provides us with a feeling
about the expected importance of political considerations by looking at whether a
dependent variable differs across political phases. This gives a basis for the exclusion in
the econometric estimations of certain variables (i.e. public expenditure) as determinants
of the endogenous variable, while supporting the inclusion of  political dummy variables.
After all, if political economy considerations are relevant, it is likely that the link stems
from their relevance over variables traditionally included as explanatory variables in a non-
political economy econometric approach.
A.  Motivation of  political/institutional dummy variables
The new political economy literature –for a survey, see  Alesina (1994) – suggests the
possible existence of two types of political cycle models:
1.  Political-business cycle
According to early models of political business-cycles ( Nordhaus, 1975, 1980) parties
manipulate policy in order to maximize their chances at re-election, stimulating economic
activity prior to elections, and stabilizing afterwards. This theory is questionable, and has
found little supporting evidence.  Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and  Rogoff (1990) offer a
model in which the informational asymmetries between government and citizens produces
a political-business cycle. According to this model, support at elections might be related to
the government’s delivery of short-term benefits
48. In this strand of literature,
governments, in order to gain re-election for their party, manage economic policy in such
a way that policy is expansionary during the last year in office, and  contractionary in the
                                                       
47  Political economy analysis of exchange rate policy based on descriptive rather than on econometric analysis is undertaken, among
others, by Nelson et al.  (1971), Diaz-Alejandro (1976) and Wiesner (1978).
48  Recent work on political business cycles in reference to Latin America include Stein and Streb (1998,199).- 19 - 19
next. In terms of four-year governments, this is captured through a dummy variable that is
–1 the first year, +1 the last, and 0 in between.
While  Nordhaus and  Rogoff and Sibert mainly refer to fiscal policy, Sections II
and III of this paper indicate that in Colombia such a pattern might be observed in regard
to exchange rate policy, under the assumption that, at least since 1967, a weak currency
seems to have been politically appealing.
49 It should be noted that there is an important
time-dimension difference between fiscal and exchange rate policy.  While the stance in the
former is well approximated by the yearly budget, the stance in the latter cannot be
captured with low-frequency observations.
2.  Partisan theory
The original formulation is due to  Hibbs (1977). Alesina (1988) proposed an alternative
model, in hich parties are rational, and in which differences in behavior can be ascribed to
differences in the underlying party coalitions. In both cases, ideology is the driving force.
Parties left of center implement policies that favor growth as opposed to stability, while
parties at the right of center favor low inflation. Empirically, if the dependent variable is in
nominal terms (i.e. the rate of devaluation) the dummy variable is 0 throughout a right-of-
center government, 1 otherwise.
3.  Other political dummy variables
In addition to the above models, our previous discussion suggests that in the particular
case of Colombia, some additional political/institutional dummy variables should be
considered.  Such is the case of differentiating between ( i) National Front governments
and non-National Front administrations to capture the fact that in the former there was no
active political competition;  (ii) the exchange rate regime (fixed until 1967, crawling peg
until 1993, and crawling band ever since); (iii) the nature of the central bank’s board
(private until 1963, fully controlled by the government until 1991, and “independent” since
1991).
B.  Descriptive analysis throughout alternative political/institutional phases
Before presenting the results of the econometric analysis, a brief description of the
evolution of the dependent variables is useful.  Table 12 uses monthly data to calculate the
means for the nominal rate of devaluation and the real exchange rate. We want to examine
whether the variables considered exhibit important differences throughout four of the five
political/institutional dummy variables mentioned above.
50
The data in the table is quite revealing.  Regarding the rate of devaluation, it has
been higher during Conservative than during Liberal administrations, and much higher
after the National Front political arrangement.  In addition, it was similar during the period
of fixed (but frequently adjusted) parities and during the crawling peg, but it has been
smaller during the crawling band years.  Finally, nominal devaluation has been smaller
during the tenure of an independent central bank. 
51
                                                       
49  This hypothesis is in sharp contrast to the intuition in Nelson  et al (1971, pp. 248), according to whom “the identification of the
exchange rate with national prestige is a phenomenon found in virtually every country.  Devaluation is never a popular act with the
electoral majority, although it may be in the interests of certain minority groups.”
50  Below, the political business cycle model is analyzed using monthly data, not annual averages based on monthly data.
51 Certainly, a similar, and maybe indistinguishable story can be told with regard to the rate of inflation.  In the context oh a heavily- 20 - 20
With regard to the RER, it has been weaker (higher) during Liberal administrations
and following the National Front. In addition, it was lower during the fixed exchange rate
regime, coinciding with the private nature of the central bank’s board. The RER  estimated
by the central bank has an upward trend (Figure 1).
52 That being the case, any
political/institutional event occurring towards the end of the sample period will be
associated with a weaker real exchange rate, all other things constant. This upward trend
is not a matter of concern, since the econometric exercises reported below use “RER
misalignments” as the dependent variable.
C.  Empirical analysis
Before presenting the econometric estimations, it is interesting to make reference to the
possible existence of a political business cycle (PBC) in two key variables: devaluation and
inflation.
Figures 3 and 4 show the average (monthly) nomin al rate of devaluation and the
average (monthly) rate of inflation.  The exact month of each of the last 10 presidential
elections (from 1958 until 1994) was identified. Elections took place either in May or in
June (“election time” in the graphs).  For both variables, two averages were calculated for
every month of the year: one average includes all years in the sample (i.e. all Januarys
from 1958 until 1994, yielding the “average year” line in the graphs); the other average
includes only months of election years (i.e. every fourth January from 1958 until 1994,
yielding the “election year” line in the graphs).
For both variables, the months prior to an electoral period are similar regardless of
whether it is an election year or an average year.  That is to say, once controlling for
seasonal elements (which seem to be quite relevant in the case of inflation), there seems to
be no particular change in exchange rate policy or in inflation in the months leading to an
election.
Interestingly, differences do emerge in the monthly pattern of exchange rate policy
in the months  following an election. New presidents take office in early August.  Figure 3
does show that in an election year the nominal rate of devaluation is  lower than in an
average year during the 2-3 month period between an election and an inauguration.
Consequently, in the 2-3 months following inauguration, the nominal rate of devaluation is
higher than during an average year.
One can therefore argue that although exchange rate policy does not seem t o be
altered as a function of a presidential election, it is still the case that outgoing
administrations prefer to strive for nominal stability in the months prior to the transferring
of power.  In Colombia, as in many other countries, the new administration is generally
left with the responsibility of correcting for (some degree of) exchange rate
overvaluation.
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indexed economy, the linkages (in both directions) between inflation and devaluation are obvious. In the context of this paper, lack of
concern for nominal stability refers to the acceptance of a high rate of inflation and/or of a high rate of nominal devaluation,  regardless of
which one causes which.  We are well aware that there might be cases in which devaluation “comes first” (i.e. as a reaction to a decline in
the terms of trade), and others in which it “comes last” (i.e. a fiscal deficit might be monetized, producing inflation and inducing a nominal
depreciation).
52   Estimations not reported confirm that it is a non-stationary variable .
53  A similar finding for the Latin American region as a whole is reported in Frieden  et al. (1999).- 21 - 21
We now proceed to present the results of the econometric exercises.  Two
dependent variables have been considered.  In Table 13 we have the (quarterly) nominal
rate of devaluation of the Colombian peso against the US dollar.  In Table 14 the
dependent variable is the deviation from trend of a PPP-version of the real exchange rate.
Nominal devaluation. The OLS estimation uses quarterly data for the 1960:2-1997:4
period. The strictly exogenous explanatory variables are the terms of trade (TOT); the
lagged values of Venezuela’s nominal inflation (INFVEN), Venezuela being Colombia’s
most important non-coffee trading partner; and foreign interest rates  ( proxied by TBILL,
the nominal rate of interest on 3 month US Treasury bills).
54
Several dummy are included.  DPBC is the “political business cycle” dummy. In
non presidential election years it is equal to zero in every quarter.  In presidential election
years it is 0 in the first and fourth quarters, 1 in the second and –1 in the third, in order to
capture the fact that elections always take place between April and June.  DFN is the
“Frente Nacional” dummy (1 during the front, 0 otherwise); DCONS is the “partisan”
dummy (1 during conservative administrations, 0 otherwise); DFIXED is the “exchange
rate regime” dummy (1 if fixed, 0 otherwise); DIND is the “central bank” dummy (1 if
independent, 0 otherwise).  In addition, RERMISAILG captures the degree of
misalignment in the RER, as defined above.
55
 In the five estimations reported, no less than 65% of the variance of the nominal
rate of devaluation is explained by the variables under consideration.  The inclusion of the
lagged dependent variable removes any problems of first-order serial auto-correlation.
Consistently, TOT is significant and has the expected negative sign. Neither the foreign
interest rate nor the Venezuelan inflation rate showed up as significant.
 Turning to the political/institutional dummy variables, two consistently do not
appear as significant, DPBC and DFIXED.  The latter result suggests that the fixed but
unsustainable peg regime in place during 1960-67, yielded average quarterly rates of
devaluation that were no different than those obtained during the crawling peg and
crawling band periods.
In all but one estimation, the nature of the board of the central bank was
significant.  In particular, and controlling for all other variables, the nominal rate of
devaluation is lower during the tenure of the independent central bank. This result is not
very surprising, in light of what was described in the third section.  In particular, the
independent central bank has as its sole objective the control of inflation, a task that has
prompted it to adopt several policies, including a deliberate strengthening of the currency.
More interestingly, DFN is highly significant in all the estimations, and has the
expected negative sign.  In the spirit of Bates (1997), the smaller the degree of political
competition –as during the National Front period—the more likely governments will
pursue policies that do not compromise economic stability.  The National Front formally
ended in 1974.  In the previous two years world oil prices dramatically increased and
                                                       
54   For details on the precise definition of all variables, including sources, see Appendix 3.
55 It is important to note that certain obvious explanatory variables have been excluded.  In particular, the domestic rate of inflation and
the stance in terms of monetary and/or fiscal policy have been excluded. This has been so, because it is precisely thorough this variables
that all political economy determinants express themselves.  For example, if it is the case that DCONS is positive and significant, then it
follows that during conservative administrations control variables such as fiscal and monetary policy are set in such a way as to
accommodate a higher rate of nominal devaluation.  It is highly unlikely that, if these control variables were explicitly included in the
estimations, any political economy dummy variable would show up as significant.- 22 - 22
several indexation mechanisms were introduced in Colombia, including an indexed unit of
account for certain financial transactions, and the consolidation of yearly adjustments of
the minimum wage.  In addition, after allegations of fraud, the president elected in 1970
pushed for an important increase in public expenditure, increase that went on to become
permanent.  Since these events have been mentioned as possible determinants of the
increase in Colombia’s rate of inflation from single to double digits in the first half of the
1970s, it is possible that our DMFN variable is actually capturing these events.
Even if that were the case, our basic premise would still hold, in the sense that lack of
commitment for nominal stability came about precisely when political competition became
a reality.  After all, most countries faced the same shock as Colombia, but most saw only
temporary, not permanent increases in the rate of growth of key nominal variables.  If
whatever sparked this increases is uncertain, the propagation mechanisms, including most
prominently the generalization of  indexation, can certainly be understood as a political
reaction geared towards minimizing the adverse re-distributive effects usually ascribed to
inflation.
Finally, DCONS is sig nificant and positive in 3 of 4 estimations. As we saw in the
latter part of the previous section, the corroboration that Conservative administrations
have witnessed higher nominal  devaluations might have something to do with politics –i.e.
in spite of the a-political nature of the coffee growers federation, the Conservative Party
has always been dominant in the rather traditional, and more religious coffee growing
region.
During our sample period, there were very few Conservative administrations, and
one of them (Betancur, 1982-86) engineered the most important nominal depreciation in
recent memory, in order to correct for a highly overvalued exchange rate and to avoid an
imminent balance of payments crises (see section III).  It would be highly inappropriate to
suggest that this event was motivated by the Conservatives’ lack of commitment to
nominal stability.  In fact, when controlling for the misalignment in the RER (estimation
4), DCONS is no longer significant.
56 However, it is still possible to argue that when
confronted with an overvalued exchange rate, Conservative administrations are readily
willing to implement a nominal depreciation, and that readiness has to do with the fact that
the party’s most important constituents are the main beneficiaries of a weak currency.
Real exchange rate deviations from trend. We compute the difference between the
“observed” RER and the forecast from an estimation (available upon request) in which the
level of the RER depends on the terms of trade, productivity in the tradable and in the
non-tradable sector, the fiscal deficit and the capital account balance. The misalignment is
positive when the observed RER is above (i.e. more depreciated) than its forecast value.
OLS estimations using annual data for the 1961-94 period are reported in Table
14.  The first result that should be highlighted is that the misalignment is positively
correlated with the fiscal incentive (FISINCENT
57). This finding suggests that when
                                                       
56  In this case, the misalignment is computed at every point in time (i.e. for every quarter) as the difference between the (log of) RER and
its permanent component, the latter constructed with a  Hodrick-Prescott filter.  One certainly feels more conmfortable with a    “RER
misalignment” that is derived from the residuals of a well specified regression in which the dependent variable is the RER.   While we are
able to do follow this procedure in the case of annual data (as in Table 14), we acanot do it when dealing with quarterly data, since many
of the right-hand side “fundamentals” are not available at this frequency.
57  Computed as the following ratio:  (import taxes+taxes on coffee exports + annual change in external public debt  - interest on external
public debt + Ecopetrol net exports + coal exports)/GDP.  See Appendix 3.- 23 - 23
tailoring exchange rate policy, the fiscal consequences of a devaluation are taken into
account.  As described in the appendix, the fiscal incentive is affected both by stocks
(government foreign assets and liabilities) and by flows (public sector imports and exports
and trade-related taxes).
While the nominal rate of devaluation was lower during National Front
administrations, the RER misalignment was  positive.  This might suggest that,
notwithstanding nominal exchange rate policy, other determinants of the RER (in
particular, fiscal policy) were probably being conducted in such a fashion that
competitiveness in real terms was enhanced.   In any case, if the exchange rate was already
depreciated in real terms, there is less need to increase the nominal rate of devaluation.
As expected given the results reported in Table 13, DCONS does not show up as
significant in Table 14.  It is important to recall that Table 13 used quarterly data, whereas
Table 14 uses yearly observations.  If it is true that conservative administrations actively
use nominal exchange rate policy to correct (quarterly) misalignments in the RER, then it
should be the case that yearly RER misalignments do not depend on which political party
holds power.
The MISALIGN is negatively correlated with DIND, a result that is hardly
surprising, given the discussion presented in the third section.  Similarly, the fact that
DFIXED shows up as negative and significant suggests that, as is generally accepted, one
of the drawbacks of a fixed exchange rate regime in the context of a moderate inflation is
that it tends to strengthen the currency in real terms (in our context, it keeps the RER
below its forecast value).
D.  The 1994 Presidential election
As was noted above, the National Front’s bipartisan coalition for all practical purposes
lasted until 1990. In that sense, during the last forty years Colombia has only witnessed
two truly contested presidential elections, that of 1990 and that of 1994. The first one was
a run-away by Liberal candidate  Gaviria, who was not only running on the coat tails of
slain anti-drug campaigner  Galán, he also faced a divided Conservative opposition.
The 1994 debate was certainly more interesting. It featured  Ernesto Samper from
the Liberal party, Andrés Pastrana from the Conservative and Antonio  Navarro from AD-
M19 (a leftist coalition).  The 1991 Constitution mandated that the winner had to
command an absolute majority, thereby instituting run-off elections. That of 1994 featured
Samper, the eventual winner, and  Pastrana.
A brief summary of  Samper and  Pastrana’s positions regarding key economic
issues is provided in Chart 1. It clearly shows that if it had been the case that for some
three decades ideological differences had all but vanished, these differences were quite
explicit in 1994.  In terms of the partisan model described below, Colombians clearly were
faced with a left of center option in Mr.  Samper and a right of center alternative in Mr.
Pastrana.  While  Samper favored growth promotion through nominal policies,  Pastrana
run on a supply-side oriented platform.   More specifically,  Samper was well in favor of
enhancing international competition through active management of the nominal exchange
rate.  On that account, Mr. Samper, the liberal candidate, should presumably have done
better in those parts of the country which are more outward oriented in their productive- 24 - 24
structure, while Mr.  Pastrana should have done relatively better in those parts more
heavily dependent on non-tradable production.
Table 15 has two sets of information.  Columns (1)-(5) report the results of
presidential elections at the Department level; column (6) indicates the degree of
tradability of each department’s output (according to the 1992 National Accounts;  see
note to the table).  Columns (1)-(3) show the ratio of the conservative to the liberal vote
for the 1986, 1990, and 1994 elections
58; column (4) reports the average for this ratio for
1986/1990; column (5) indicates the  change in the ratio between 1994 and the 1986/1990
average.  Even though the liberal candidate won all three elections (the average for the
conservative/liberal ratio for the entire country was always below 1), it is quite evident
that conservatives have made consistent, significant progress at the national level as well
as in most departments. Certainly, one would like to control for this general trend.  That is
the purpose of column (5), which shows that the average improvement by conservatives at
the national level between 1986/90 and 1994 was 29.7%. Of course, in some departments
the improvement was larger than this average, while in others it was smaller.
In 7 of the 10 departments in which the improvement by conservatives in 1994 was
above average, the share of tradables in GDP was  below the national average (48.05%).
Correspondingly, in 10 of the 13 departments in which the 1994 improvement by
conservatives was below average, the share of tradables in GDP was  above the national
average. In conclusion, once correcting by an improving trend by conservatives since
1986, the table shows that whether the marginal improvement in 1994 was above or below
average seems to be associated with the expected economic impact of announced
exchange rate policy on departmental economic well-being, given each departments
productive structure.  This was true in 17 out of 23 cases.
V.  Summary and conclusions
By regional standards, since the 1960s Colombia has exhibited notorious economic
stability and institutional continuity.  Until recently, the political system was based on an
entrenched bipartisan coalition, with little ideological confrontation between the Liberal
and the Conservative parties.  Power sharing, which was mandatory during the National
Front (NF, 1958-74), lasted until 1991. Extreme economic positions seldom emerged,
reflecting the non-ideological character of the political coalition.
Coffee, the main export, is a labor-intensive activity, taking place in thousands of
family-owned small plots.  Coffee producers’ income depends on the domestic price of
coffee, in turn the result of a complex arrangement with the government, the exchange
rate being but one component.  Overall, the relevance of labor unions has been declining,
although in key public sector activities there relevance has probably been enhanced.
Following a 1968 Constitutional amendment, Congress’ role in economic issues has been
limited to fiscal policy, the tailoring of the budget being its main concern.
A survey of key episodes from 1962 to 1997 indicates that efforts have generally
been geared towards delivering a moderate rate of inflation and a competitive real
exchange rate. Widespread indexation has made this arrangement palatable to most
interest groups.  Historically, exchange rate policy was conducted in tandem with
                                                       
58   During the 1990 elections Conservatives were divided.  There was an “official” candidate as well as an “independent” one.  For our
purposes, the sum of the two is the relevant outcome.- 25 - 25
commercial, financial, and fiscal policies.  The latter were used as compensatory
mechanisms, designed to garner private sector support for the chosen path of the
exchange rate.  More recently, when market-oriented structural reforms were introduced,
most compensatory mechanisms disappeared, and interest groups became vocal regarding
exchange rate policy. This description holds true for all business associations, including
the coffee growers federation.
Institutional continuity and the longevity of the exchange rate regime –which
basically remained unaltered during the 1967-91 period-- suggest that political
considerations might not be relevant in explaining the stable pattern of key economic
variables. This intuition  is not fully supported by the numbers.  Econometric estimations
indicate that the nominal rate of devaluation was  lower during NF administrations and
higher during Conservative governments. The first result supports the fact that political
competition might imply less concern for stability.  The second could be partially explained
by the political influence of the Conservative Party in the coffee-growing region and to the
willingness of Conservative administrations to accelerate the nominal rate of depreciation
to correct for currency overvaluations.
In addition, the nominal rate of devaluation seems to depend on the nature of the
central bank board.  In particular, it has been mainly during the tenure of an “independent”
central bank that exchange rate policy has been actively used to bring down inflation.- 26 - 26
Appendix 1.  Political aspects of the 1966 confrontation with the Fund
According to local lore, the confrontation originated in a disagreement on abruptly
devaluing the peso.
59 Twenty years later President Lleras confirmed this view  (Lleras,
1987).  However, other analysts have offered interpretations of the affair that, without
contradicting the President’s explicit explanation, suggest other motivations on the part of
the administration.
López (1987a) notes that the disagreement did not arise from the Government’s
stated preference for a crawling peg as opposed to a step adjustment, as the crawl had
been suggested by the Fund since 1965. He argues that the impasse had its roots in
different interpretations of the crisis: while the IMF viewed the situation as caused by lax
fiscal and monetary policies  --which could be solved with restrictive measures,
complemented with an exchange rate adjustment-- Lleras and his team believed the
problem was structural, and could not be solved without a complete overhaul of monetary,
fiscal, exchange and  trade policy instruments.
Maullin (1967) viewed the confrontation as the administration’s attempt to muster
public support that would bear on Congress to accept the draft legislation it would later
place before it.
60  He considered Lleras’ nationalistic arguments as designed to subdue
those opposing him, noting that the government soon accepted the Fund’s position, as
indicated by the swiftness with which an arrangement was reached in early 1967 ---a view
not contradicted by IMF spokesmen at the time.
61  This is consistent with statements later
made by the then Finance Minister, according to which  “since September [1966], the
President [and his team] had been leaning toward requiring prior permits for all imports,
eliminating import liberalization, and reestablishing exchange controls, eliminating as a
first step the free market for foreign exchange…”
62
All these interpretations seem quite consistent with viewing Decree-Law 444 as an
expression of the presidential power-enhancing nature of policies preferred by the Lleras
administration. In this regard, Findley  et al. (1983) describe how the constitutional
amendments adopted in 1968, about a year after the events we have been analyzing, led to
the almost complete loss of power by Congress regarding initiative in economic issues.
63
 Appendix 2.  The persistence of inflation
Although exchange rate policy was not determined solely by what was happening to
domestic prices, the rate of inflation did have significant influence on exchange rate
management. Consequently, an analysis of the political economy dimensions of inflation
can shed light on the political economy dimensions of exchange rate policy.
                                                       
59  Nelson et al. (1971) argue that policies adopted by the government were radically different from what the IMF had proposed.
60  Maullin  (1967), abridged and profusely cited in  López  (1987b).
61 A devaluation had in fact taken place with the November 1966 emergency legislation, albeit in a roundabout form ( López,  1987c).
García-  García and  Jayasuriya (1997) go even further, asserting that the confrontation with the IMF was simply the way by which
President Lleras and his team rallied political support for what in effect were IMF inspired economic policies .
62 Espinosa  (1970),  cited in López  (1987b, pp. 16, our translation).
63 A more benign interpretation of the reforms would argue that what was done was to establish solid constitutional grounds for practices
that had been going on for decades, under the guise of emergency measures adopted within periods of “state of  seige”.  In any event, Archer
and Soberg Shugart (1997) argue that Congress felt comfortable with the arrangement –after all, it later resisted presidential attempts at
restoring economic powers to congress!!— given that the party system allowed politicians to concentrate on serving  clientelistic interests
and maintaining patronage, rather than participating in nationally oriented programs.- 27 - 27
In 1970 conservative leader Misael Pastrana won the presidency with an extremely
narrow margin. Seeking a wider base of support, the new government expanded public
expenditure, in an episode that has been labeled “ el Pastranazo.” As aggregate demand
increased, domestic markets overheated and inflation, which had been kept at single digit
levels for several years, accelerated. 
64 The 1973 oil shock further compounded price
pressures. The response to the first oil shock was similar to that observed in other nations,
but differed in its persistence: while within two years inflation had begun to subside in
most countries, or had definitely skyrocketed in others, Colombia was among the few
countries where inflation remained stable at its new levels.
65  Over the next 20 years,
Colombian inflation would continuously hover around this new range. Figure 5 shows the
rate of inflation, detailing the structural change of the early 1970s.
Recent literature originating at the Colombian central bank has explored the
persistence of inflation since its upsurge of the early 1970s.  Echeverry (1996) analyzes in a
systematic way the policy responses that accompanied different inflation episodes since
1970. He concludes that, in general, the Monetary Board accommodated increases in
inflation, except on those occasions when inflation approached (or briefly surpassed) the
30 percent threshold. When this happened, his analysis shows that instruments were
adjusted to confront inflationary pressures even when, by doing so, other policy goals
(such as employment) had to be temporarily forgone. This study adequately describes why
inflation, despite its persistence, never surpassed certain upper limits.
66
Carrasquilla (1996) has gone further in this analysis by postulating rational
behavior on the part of the government and the private sector in reaching agreement on
“acceptable” limits of inflation. He hypothesizes that members of society have reached an
implicit agreement under which they are willing to accept a certain inflation (between 20
and 30%) which yields significant inflation tax revenue (about 2% of GDP), in exchange
for the latter’s commitment to provide stability in key real variables such as growth,
employment and the exchange rate. The evidence is consistent with these postulates:
between 1975 and 1995, the private sector faced significantly less variability in key
variables than it did before 1975; and the government, in turn, has been able to maintain a
lower level of debt than would otherwise have been the case. Carrasquilla then applies
Krugman’s (1992) insight on exchange rate bands to general price behavior. His results
indicate that Colombia’s inflation depends on its fundamental determinants and that since
the mid 1970s it has behaved as a  credible “inflation band” model.
                                                       
64 It also coincided with the explicit  indexation of certain financial variables , as the  Pastrana administration created a fully indexed
segment in the financial sector in order to channel resources towards housing.  Whether or not this policy decision was key in establishing
the new “inflation plateau” has been a subject of intense debate.
65  Carrasquilla (1996) shows that only Portugal and Greece had a similar pattern in the 1970s.  However, their new rates of inflation did
not persist into the 1990s as was the case in Colombia.
66  It fares less well, however, in explaining the persistence of lower limits in the inflationary process,  i..e. why the government does not
push disinflation below the lower bound of the band.- 28 - 28
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